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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

The original action was filed by Marvin R. Cox to recover $5,000.00 loaned to J. R. Berry on October 27, 1964
with 10% interest thereon, founded on a written instrument (R. 1).
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Mr. J. R. Berry in turn filed a third-party action
against five defendant directors of Zions Investment
Corporation. This alleged claim rests on an alleged
memorandum agreement of indemnification, dated November 11, 1965 (Ex. 2, R. 6). A further claim against
three of said five directors rests upon an alleged more
formal agreement of November 16, 1965 (Ex. 3, R. 6a-9).
Mr. Berry's complaint prays that the third-party defendants pay his debt if Mr. Marvin R. Cox secures judgment against him.
The third-party defendants contended that the naked
resignation of a director and president of a corporation
for an indemnification promise of economic value is an
illegal consideration as against public policy. A defense
to the alleged agreement of November 16, 1965 was that
it states on its face a lack of consideration. Additional
defenses are that both alleged agreements are void for
unfilled conditions, that the alleged memorandum is void
for indefiniteness, and that the facts create an estoppel
against J. R. Berry.
DISPOSITION OF THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
IN THE LOWER COURT
The third-party defendants filed motions to dismiss
and for summary judgment, since one of said defendants
had filed an answer. Defendants' motions were supported
by three affidavits with numerous exhibits. A counteraffidavit was filed by J. R. Berry. The motions were
heard before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge
of the Third Judicial District and were granted in the
form of a summary judgment.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The third-party defendants pray that the Summary
Judgment of the District Court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During 1963 and until November 17, 1965 Mr. J. R.
Berry was President and a Director of Zions Investment
Corporation, a Utah corporation. During 1963 and until
late on November 11, 1965 J. R. Berry was promoter,
chief salesman, supervisor of salesmen, supervisor of the
Company Prospectus of March 1, 1965 and general manager of company operations. According to said Company
Prospectus the corporation sold canyon building lots on
its Swiss Alpine properties, situated a short distance
Southwesterly from the Homestead near Midway in Wasatch County, Utah during 1963 and 1964 for $159,893.46
in cash and contracts (R. 18) .
On December 27, 1963 at a meeting of the Executive
Committee J. R. Berry represented to the corporation
that he believed it could and should secure an option to
purchase the Homestead property. On said date the corporation authorized Berry to negotiate for the purchase
by the corporation of the Homestead property. The corporation authorized a price of $350,000, with a down payment of $115,000 and a conservative, easy-to-meet, annual
payment of $21,000 until paid with interest at 6% on the
purchase price (Minutes R. 30-31). Mr. Berry borrowed
personally at 10 % interest rate, supra.
The corporate minutes of December 27, 1963 clearly
show that there was no intent on the part of the corpor-
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ation that its duly appointed agent Berry should negotiate for the purchase of the Homestead for the corporation as an undisclosed principal. The authorization shows
a clear intent that the agent should conduct such negotiations on an open and above-board relationship with the
owners of the Homestead for the corporation and report
back to the corporation. If there were in J. R. Berry's
mind on December 27, 1963 a secret intent that he would
purchase the Homestead for himself and wife for his own
personal purpose to be divulged nearly two years later,
he studiously avoided the slightest suggestion of such
intent. In violation of his fiduciary obligation he negotiated the purchase of the Homestead for himself and
purchased it for himself and wife, not purporting to act
for the corporation (R. 30-31, 19).
No corporate minutes and no affidavit of any conference with any corporate officer is had showing at any
time that the claim of a security interest was ever mentioned by J. R. Berry or anyone connected with the corporation. This new idea of a security interest for an agent
who violates his agency for his own interest was advanced for the first time in the affidavit of J. R. Berry
on the 21st day of September 1966 on the stationery of
"Law offices of Thomas, Armstrong, Rawlings and West"
(R. 23). What are the facts that are supported by the uncontradicted evidence appearing from the affidavits filed
in this case?
First, President and Director J. R. Berry called all
directors and stockholders meetings when he had concluded that any such meeting was necessary. He managed the corporate properties and affairs "in a manner
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primarily as if" they "were his own, making incomplete
reports to the Board of Directors only when he wanted
to and only to the extent he determined" (Affidavit of
Directors Draper, Graham, and Anderson R. 53).
Second, J. R. Berry negotiated ONLY for himself and
wife for his own herein-claimed, personal interest (antagonistic to the corporation) in purchasing the Homestead. He was not authorized to act in a secret manner for
the corporation as an undisclosed principal. He did not
purport to act on behalf of the corporation which is in
fact and law an essential requirement before a valid legal
ratification can occur. Mechem, Outlines of Agency, 4th
ed., Sec. 203. Mr. Berry borrowed $5,000.00 from Marvin
R. Cox, plaintiff, solely on his own credit and another
$20,000 from other parties similarly to make his own
down payment of $25,000 on his own personal purchase
with his wife of the Homestead on December 1, 1964
(R. 4). Neither Berry nor his wife personally furnished
any of the purchase price. Only Berry signed the written
agreements to secure the funds for the down payment
(R. 1).

Third, J. R. Berry did not during the entire year of
1964 call any director's meeting and/or report to any
members of the board that he was financing his own purchase of the Homestead. The first board of directors meeting at which he reported the purchase of the Homestead
was held March 25, 1965 nearly four months after he
purchased the Homestead for himself and wife (Secretary Anderson's affidavit R. 26 and 35-36).
Fourth, the plan and scheme which Mr. J. R. Berry
pursued was to call a stockholders' meeting to be held on
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February 20, 1965. It was called (R. 32). He reported
there the personal purchase of the Homestead and proposed there a contract with the corporatioa that he and
his wife would assign their rights and convey their interests in the Homestead purchase contract to the corporation if the corporation would vote by all its stockholders assembled "to assume all duties and obligations
of First Parties" (Mr. and Mrs. Berry) in the said acquisition (R. 6a and 19).
The minutes of that stockholders' meeting were supposed to have been drafted by Mrs. Kathleen Berry,
whom Mr. Berry nominated to act as secretary of the
meeting which nomination was approved (R. 32). They
are susceptible of an interpretation that the said proposed
agreement of J. R. Berry was understood and was approved unanimously by the stockholders (R. 32). The
fact and law is that there could be no ratification of Mr.
and Mrs. Berry's actions. She had never been appointed
as an agent of the corporation, and Mr. Berry in buying
the Homestead for himself and wife did not purport to
the seller to be acting for Zions Investment Corporation
within the scope of his authority. (R. 30-32 & 19).
Fifth, promptly after the stockholders' meeting of February 20, 1965 J. R. Berry furnished information for and
supervised the printing of a company "PROSPECTUS"
dated March 1, 1965. Therein is confirmed publicly the
agreement for and the assignment to the corporation of
the Homestead purchase contract of the Berrys. (R. 19).
The Prospectus declares the Homestead to be the property of the corporation and on page four thereof reads as
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follows:
The contract was assigned by this group to the company and accepted by the company at a special
meeting of the stockholders on February 20, 1965.
Mr. Berry received no bonus-for his efforts. Others
of the group are to be repaid the sums paid by them
on the purchase price in capital stock of the company
at $1.25 per share or by return of their cash plus
interest (10% simple) on or before October 31, 1965.
The Company must make a payment of $50,000 on
or before April 1, 1965 and at that time assume possession of the property ( R. 19) .
Sixth, a board of directors meeting was duly called and
held March 25th, 1965. Mr. Berry reported that he had
been unable to raise money to pay the $50,000 payment
on the Homestead purchase contract due April 1, 1965
(R. 35). A resolution was passed authorizing the corporation to borrow $50,000 and pledging the directors to cosign the note (R. 36). The note was signed as agreed (R.
37) and nearly six months later demand made upon the
directors for payment of $39,262.20 on October 25, 1965
(R. 38). In signing said $50,000 note the third-party defendants fully relied upon the representations of Berry
and upon the agreement of Berry and wife reaffirmed in
print on page 4 of the Prospectus (R. 19) that the corporation at the February 20th stockholders meeting had accepted the offered assignment of the Homestead purchase
contract and had become bound to reimburse Mr. Berry
for his loans made in acquisition of said contract (R. 54).
The Prospectus unequivocally stated that the Homestead
was the property of the corporation (R. 19). This was repeatedly told to stockholders (R. 54, 59, 60 and 61), of-
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ficers, prospective stock purchasers and prospective condominium purchasers (R. 54, 59, 60 and 61) by Berry and
his salesmen.
Seventh, J. R. Berry makes a controlling admission in
his pleadings, Exhibit 3 thereof, (R. 6a) which over his
signature reads as follows:
WHEREAS, First Parties have held the said property and rights as trustees for Second Party since on
and after a certain meeting of the stockholders of
Zions Investment Corporation held, in Salt Lake
City, Utah on the 20th day of February, 1965, whereat the stockholders accepted the conveyance of said
property and rights and agreed to assume all duties
and obligations of First Parties (Mr. and Mrs. Berry)
respecting the said acquisition; ... (R. 6a).
The foregoing is a binding admission that the Berrys
were legally bound to assign all their interest and rights
as trustees to the corporation prior to the signing of the
alleged agreements of November 11th and 16th, 1965.
They had received valid consideration for said obligation.
Eighth, Mr. Berry repeatedly made informal statements of glowing sales reports. For example, he reported
sales of lots during 1964 for $159,893.46 on which cash
of $76,818.32 was realized (R. 19) and in a letter to Secretary Anderson on July 21, 1965 stated that "in these
past months" preceding June 30th sales were made in
the total of $155,500.00 (R. 41). However, as usual, regarding expenditures, Mr. Berry reported only that "Our
cash outlays are considerable." When the directors were
served with a demand on October 25, 1965 to pay nearly
$40,000 personally on the corporate note to First Security

9

State Bank the dissatisfactions with corporate management by Mr. Berry became acute. Later bankruptcy of
the corporation resulted (R. 16).
Ninth, on November 9, 1965 President J. R. Berry gave
a notice by telegram that a directors' meeting would be
held on November 11, 1965, only two days after the sending of the notice (R. 40). Not all directors received the
notice before the meeting (R. 28). Only six of nine directors attended the illegally called meeting (R. 28). No
written waivers of notice or of approval of the meeting of
any alleged action thereat were ever made by any of the
absent directors. The corporate articles required five
days notice for a legal call of a directors' meeting (R. 28).
Third-party plaintiff Berry in paragraph 8 of his statement of facts has printed what he states to be a corporate
resolution of November 11, 1966 (Berry's brief pp. 5-6).
Obviously there can be no corporate resolution at an illegally called and held corporate meeting. Plaintiff
pleads Exhibit 2, the alleged memorandum agreement of
Berry's third party complaint. (R. 6). The alleged resolution set out in Berry's brief pp. 5-6 although of no legal
force does nevertheless serve one purpose. It shows the
clearly stated conditions which are found in said Exhibit
2 that "the corporation, and their (all) directors (must)
agree to fully hold him harmless from any claim,'' as a
condition precedent to his alleged resignation as director
and President.
Tenth, J. R. Berry states in his brief, page 3, that "the
directors and stockholders-recognized and acknowl-
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edged the security interest of J. R. Berry in and to said
property," meaning the Homestead. There is no truth
whatever in said statement. There is no support in any
of the pleadings or documents cited in the affidavits for
any such allegation. The truth is that the mention of an
alleged security interest by the fiduciary-breaching J. R.
Berry appeared for the first time when J. R. Berry and
his attorney filed his counter-affidavit in this case. No
appellate court decisions were cited by Berry that there
can be any security interest in an agent who made an
unauthorized contract for himself for his conflicting personal benefit to the detriment of his principal.
Eleventh, the conditional and indefinite alleged memorandum agreement reads as follows:
11-11-65
I hereby resign from my position as a director and
President of Zions Investment Corporation providing
that the existing Directors and the Corporation save
me harmless fro many and all activities which I participated in while President and Director of the corporation. (Excepting embezzlement.)

Robert H. Graham
J. R. Berry
Vivian M. Scheller
Accepted - Secretary
R. C. Draper
Joseph Anderson, Jr.
L. P. Slagle
Signed before me this 11th day of November 1965.
Joseph Anderson, Jr.
Gordon Christensen, Notary
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A RESIGNATION OF DIRECTORSHIP FOR ANY ECONOMIC GAIN OR PROFIT IS ILLEGAL AND VOID.

11

Fletcher, Cyclopedia or Corporation Law, Per. ed. Section 348 declares the law applicable to the present fact
situation to be as follows:
Sec. 348. Validity of agreement to resign for pecuniary consideration.
It has been held that an agreement to resign as a

corporate officer, for a pecuniary consideration, is
void as against public policy. Thus, it has been said
that if the whole or a part of a consideration be that
a trustee resign his trust, the consideration is illegal.
It is contra bona mores. Trustees of corporations owe
duties to others besides themselves; they have been
placed in a position of trust by the stockholders, and
to those stockholders they must be faithful. It is a
violation of that trust for them to be bought out of
office. They may resign when they please, but they
must not make profit or benefit to themselves in the
matter of such resignation. 61 Sharrett v. Northfield
Savings & Loan Assn., 272 App. Div. 835, 70 N.Y.S.
(2d) 870, citing Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed)
Sec. 348. Forbes v. McDonald 54 Cal. 98; Ballentine
v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 668.
In other words, directors cannot accept payment in
any form or guise for their resignations and delivery
of control or for the substitution of others in their
place and are accountable for any monies so received. 62 Mitchell v. Dilbeck 10 Cal. 2d 341, 74 P.2d
233; McClure v. Law 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 338, 76
Am. St. Rep. 262; Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S. 2d
822, 651, s.c. 30 N.Y. 2d 755; Porter v. Healey 244
Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428. Note 1 Dodd & Baker, Cases on
Business Associations 604.
Contract to cause directors to resign and for others
to be named by another corporation is ultra vires
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under New Jersey law Hold v. California Development Company 151 Fed. 3, and T.F. Pagel Lumber
Co. v. Webster 231 Wis. 222, 285 N.W. 739. (Italics
supplied for emphasis.)
A brief analysis of some of the cases cited by Fletcher,
supra, will show the wide application of the general rule
that selling one's offices by resigning for economic gain
or profit is illegal.
The first paragraph above under Sec. 348 within quote
marks is quoted verbatim from the 1880 California case
of Forbes et .al. v. McDonald et. al. 54 Cal. 98 at p. 100.
It is the corporate law today and has been ever since 1880
in a situation which exists here. It was contra bona mores
for Mr. J. R. Berry to attempt to bargain away his offices
of Director and President for a valuable pecuniary consideration. Neither he nor those claiming through him can
legally state any claim for relief on such grounds.
In the case of Sharrett v. Northfield Savings and Loan
Association 1947, 272 App. Div. 835, 70 N.Y. Supp (2d)
870 which cites Fletcher on Corporations on the above
question; the plaintiff sought to enforce payment of a life
pension alleging that the Port Richmond Association
(merged into the defendant) contracted with him to that
if he would resign his off ices of director and secretary
and refrain from seeking reelection to office, and remove
his real estate and insurance office from the building in
which the offices of the association were located, the association would give him a pension for life paying him
$200 per month.
Held, the contract to resign as a director for a personal

13
benefit to himself was a legally insufficient consideration.
In the above case part of the consideration given would
have been good and valid consideration had it been given
by itself. However, in the earlier case of Ballantine v.
Ferretti 1941, 28 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 688 the court broadly
declared that:
Contracts by which corporate officers or directors
take pay " (economic benefits)" for their action as
such are contrary to public policy, because of their
nature and general tendency, without inquiry into
any given case whether harm resulted in fact or
whether complaint was actually made and that the
law would not ordinarily undertake to apportion the
entire consideration paid upon an illegal transaction
merely because the transaction would have been
legal if part of it had been eliminated,-.
The Supreme Court of New York in Gerdes v. Reynolds
1941, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 622, 625 declared flatly the law to be:
A corporate officer cannot legally "accept pay in any
form or guise, direct or devious for their own resignation." (note 19.)
In the case of T. F. Pagel Lumber Co. v. Webster 1939,
231 Wis. 222, 285 N.W. 789, one of the defenses raised by
Webster on an action on his promissory note was that he
had agreed to resign and did resign as director and manager of the company. On the defense of such resignation
as consideration the Wisconsin Supreme Court wrote:
If Pagel agreed to resign in consideration of a

promise not to sue on his note, the contract was illegal and void because contrary to public policy 13
Am. Jr. 869 Sec. 888. See Koelbel v. Tecktonius 1938,
228 Wis. 317, 280 N.W. 305.
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Plaintiff Berry agrees with the above statements of law
(Plfs. brief 7), but argues that an alleged agreement to
pay the debts of another is not an agreement of pecuniary
or measurable monetary value. This argument is palpably unsound. The measure if Berry could prevail would
be $5,000 plus 10% interest.
Plaintiff also argues that the above rule of law is not ,
applicable to his case. He cites four cases each of which
presents an entirely different fact situation from this
case. The facts of this case fall squarely within the above
rule of law. There is here no negotiation for an agreed
sale of Mr. Berry's stock to the corporation or the directors, which would by itself be a valid contract. There is
here no dispute regarding J. R. Berry's salary of $1,000
per month being unpaid or any agreement whatever regarding that item. There is not in the alleged memorandum agreement of 11-11-65 supra any consideration recited other than the naked and exclusive offer to resign
and the alleged resignation of J. R. Berry as President
and Director.
An enlarged but brief analysis of the cases cited by
plaintiff will show their inapplicability to the fact-situation here. The SALE OF STOCK CASES cited by Plaintiff except the pertinent, California Mitchell case, which
is added here, are:

Joseph v. Ruff (1903) 81 N.Y. Supp. 546, Mitchell v.
Dilbeck (1937) 10 Cal. 2d 341, 74 P. 2d 233,
Mooney v. Willis Overland Motors (1953) 204 Fed.
2d 888, and
Raffner v. Sophie Mae Candy Corporation (1926)
132 S.E. 396.
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The Joseph case was an action by the Trustee in Bankruptcy to set aside an alleged preferential transfer of
corporate moneys to Mr. Ruff in the purchase of his stock
by the corporation and the compromise of other claims
which occurred more than four months prior to the filing
in bankruptcy and while the corporation was still solvent.
Held that the corporation could lawfully buy and pay for
the stock as had been done while the corporation was
solvent. The resignation was an incidental and necessary
legal occurrance upon performance of the valid agreement for the sale and purchase of all of the Director's
stock.
The Mitchell case, supra, upholds the general rule
stated by Fletcher Section 348 supra in the following
language:
fl\Vhile directors may resign when they please, they
must not make a profit to themselves in the matter
of their resignation and to be bought out of office
would be a violation of their trust. See authorities
cited in 12 L.R.A. 1071lJThe court affirmed the rule
of Forbes v. McDonald 54 Cal. 98, the leading case
declaring a situation like the alleged Berry Hold
Harmless agreement is contra bona mores, a breach
of trust, illegal and void.
The Ruffner case supra, was another case in which the
corporation purchased all the stock of the Director and
President, who thus disqualified himself for office and
resigned as an incidental and legally necessary step to
the valid sale of all of the stock of said person. The court
held that the purchase of the stock and the concomitant
resignation being in good faith and to serve the best
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interests of the corporation was a valid stock purchase by
the corporation from its President and Director at reasonable value therefor and declared that purchase by a corporation of its own stock is valid.
Where the stock is not retired but is held for resale
and reissue and the purchase was not prejudicial to
creditors after the transaction was completed.
The Mooney case supra like the other cases cited by
plaintiff's attorney, David E. West, are cases mainly dealing with the question of whether a corporation can legally pur~hase stock from a director or whether such
transaction may be set aside as improper dealing of an
agent and trustee with his principal, the corporation.
The Mooney case, supra, was one in which the plaintiff
stockholder had sold all his stock to the corporation and
resigned and sought to recover from the corporation the
expenses including legal fees for defending a minority
stockholders suit against him under claim of statutory
right of a Delaware statute 44 Del. Laws c. 125 Apr. 15,
1953 allowing such actions against the corporation by its
director who had been sued for mismanagement or fraud.
The case involved the question of fact as to whether
the director coming in had the best interests of the corporation at heart and the court comments on that fact in
citing with approval the rule of illegality of bargaining a
resignation of office for economic value and cites with
approval "2 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations Sec.
348", but again as in the other cases distinguishes the fact
situation from the situation existing in the Berry case
and in the cases cited by Fletcher Sec. 348, supra.
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Nor can Third-party Plaintiff J. R. Berry take any
comfort from the California case of Crispinel v. Color
Corporation of America (1958) (2nd Dist. Cal. App.) 325
P. 2d 565. In that case plaintiff was employed for ~ of
full time in counselling the board and officers and employees at a salary of $13,000 per month under a written
contract which provided that (par. 6)
"Crespinel understands that it may be necessary for
the business of the corporation that a seat on the
board of directors be available, for instance in the
event that other financial interests become associated
with Cine color" and he agreed to terminate his employment and resign "at the request of the majority
of the board."
The request was made, the resignation had, a large
sum in partial settlement paid to Crispinel. He, however,
sued for $14,500 claimed due, received judgment which
was affirmed. The defense was that the agreement was
illegal because it contained the agreement to resign at
request of the board. The court held that the particular
agreement was not violative of public policy but affirmed
the general rule that an agreement like that of the alleged Berry hold harmless agreement would be invalid
in California. The court in rendering its opinion in the
Crespinel case wrote; after citing the case of Trumbo v.
Bank of Berkeley 77 Cal. App. 704, 709, 176 P. 2d 376, 379
as establishing the general rule in the Berry situation:
A director may not contract away his discretionary
vote or director's position for a consideration. Such
agreement is violative of public policy and is void.
The Court in analyzing the particular facts of the
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Crespinel case said that the particular contract was distinguishable from the situation wherein a director had
bargained away his position as a director for a consideration. The consideration which Mr. Crispinel received
was for his contract of services, not for his resignation.
Nor can any help be found for Mr. J. R. Berry in his
desire to be free from all responsibility for his own bad ,
management by having five directors pay all of his debts
during more than two years except the debt which would
amount to an embezzlement,-in the note in 28Cinn. L.
Rev. 380-81. That law note by some bright law student is
centered around the Crispenel case, supra. After distinguishing the valid stock sale cases from the situation here
of an attempt to force other directors to buy Mr. Berry
out of office the note writer concludes; regarding the two
distinguishable fact situations:
Where the circumstances appear questionable and
the director has in fact 'sold out' a breach of his
fiduciary duty becomes apparent and his contract
would be void in spite of the statute permitting him
to deal with his company.
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The note writer is here referring to the amendment of
the California Corporation Code Sec. 820 (1952) which ,
dispensed with the former rule disqualifying a director
from dealing in any way with his corporation for his own
benefit. If plaintiff wished to raise the question of a reasonable price for a resignation by a director and President, he should state the fact by affidavit that he was
attempting to bargain away his offices for a certain or an
approximate amount of thousands of dollars and then
argue that the true figure would be reasonable under the
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circumstances. This he has not done.
POINT II

THE UNFULFILLED CONDITIONS OF RESIGNATION EXPRESSLY STATED ON THE FACE OF EXHIBIT 2 DEFEATS THIRD-PARTY CLAIM FOR RELIEF.

Exhibit 2, the resignation instrument, is expressly conditional on its face. It is clearly not a bilateral agreement
of promise for a promise. Williston, Contracts 1938 ed.,
Sec. 13.
It is stated as a unilateral, conditional act of resignation
for contemplated future acts of saving harmless as indemnitors the drafter of the instrument provided that
''the corporation and" (all) "existing directors save me
harmless." The affidavit of Director Robert H. Graham
shows that only five directors' names appear on Exhibit
L out of nine directors other than Berry (R. 16, and see
also Secretary Anderson's affidavit, R. 28, 37). The conuition of all existing directors signing is not fulfilled. Exhibit 2 has no validity. If the offer is not accepted by
performance of the act stated as a condition precedent
then no unilateral contract arises. The condition of indemnification is not performed and Berry was still a Director, albeit an inactive one, until November 17, 1965
when the resignation became automatically effective by
reason of corporate article SIXTH ( c) (R. 28).
The second express condition on the face of Exhibit 2
that the corporation-Zions Investment Corporation:::.hould become a signing indemnitor on the alleged agreement. The instrument shows on its face that the corporis
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ation did not sign. Section 25-5-4 (2), Utah Code 1953
requires that an agreement to answer for the debt of another is void unless there is an agreement "in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged." The purported
signature "accepted Joseph A. Anderson Jr. Secretary"
is merely descriptio personae of the individual signing
and is not in law a subscribed signature of the corporation, Zions Investment Corporation.
The significance of a condition is declared as follows:

Williston, Contract, Vol. IV, 1936, Sec. 1244. "When
non-compliance with a condition on which a contract
is delivered by a surety relieves him from liability. ,
If the surety delivers his contract to the creditor
upon a condition or in return for a counter-promise,
and the creditor fails to observe the condition or to
keep the promise, he cannot hold the surety; but
often the surety's contract is not delivered by him
directly to the creditor, but to the principal or a cosurety to whom some condition is stated. It is common situation for a surety to have signed a bond or
other contract, and the principal or a co-surety who
was expected to join in the contract, and whose name
is perhaps recited in the instrument as a party, to
have failed to execute it. The signature of the principal or co-surety may be altogether lacking, or it
may appear to be signed without authority."

1

POINT III
ALLEGED MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT IS VOID
FOR INDEFINITNESS OR IF REGARDED AS DEF·
INITE IS THEN VOID FOR ILLEGALITY IN AGREE·
ING TO PAY ALL POSSIBLE CRIMINAL FINES
AGAINST BERRY EXCEPT FOR EMBEZZELMENT.
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One phrase in the memorandum reads:
... save me harmless from any and all activities
which I participated in while President and Director
of the corporation. (Excepting embezzlement.)
This should be construed most strongly against the
drafter J. R. Berry. The word "activities" is broader than
the word "debts." If the word "activities" be construed in
its broadest meaning it would then make an agreement
to pay all criminal fines which might be imposed for
negligent or reckless driving of an automobile while
Berry was President of the corporation and for violation
of the state securities act, and for securing money by
false pretenses by fraudulent representations made in
selling stock and condominium units etc., except embezzlement. The word "activities" appears all too elastic to
be definite enough to be contractual. Williston, Contracts
1938 ed., Sec. 37.
If the word "activities" be definite enough to be contractual and would, if otherwise valid, hold Mr. Berry
harmless from criminal fines of any and all kinds except
embezzlement then the memorandum is illegal as against
public policy in tending to exhonerate one from criminal
responsibility of fines.

An agreement by the terms
sumes punishment for the
proper and void. 17 C.J.S.
States v. McCue, D.C. Conn.,

of which one person asguilt of another is imSec. 227 citing United
178 Fed. Supp. 426.

POINT IV
NO CORPORATE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ILLEGALLY CALLED MEETING OF NOVEMBER 11, 1965.
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The undisputed fact is that the corporate article
SIXTH (b) required five days notice of a directors' meet.
ing (R. 28). Berry sent a telegraph notice on November 9,
1966 calling a directors' meeting two days later (R. 40).
Only six directors responded to the notice. There were no
waivers made or filed by any of the three absent directors (R. 28).
On the foregoing undisputed facts the following case
gives the clearly established rule of corporation law
showing the resolution claimed by plaintiff (plf's brief
p. 5) of no legal effect.
Where the call of a corporate meeting does not conform
to the requirements of the statute or the corporate articles if the statute allows a shorter time of notice by
article or by law contract the meeting is invalid and attempted action thereat is also invalid. Glehe v. Arnett
(1924) 38 Id. 763, 225 Pac. 797, 799.
POINT V
THERE IS NO CONSIDERATION GIVEN BY BERRY
IN THE ALLEGED CONTRACT OF NOVEMBER 16,
1965.
The above statement of facts shows that on and after
February 20, 1965 J. R. Berry and wife were legally
bound to assign the Homestead purchase contract to the
corporation (minutes R. 32; Company Prospectus R. 19;
last paragraph p. 1 of alleged agreement of November 16,
1966, R. 6a).
It is elementary contract law that promising to do what
one is already legally bound to do (here assign the Home·
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stead purchase contract to the corporation (R. 6a, last
paragraph of page 1 of Exhibit 3) is no consideration for
the promise of another. Necessarily the alleged agreement of November 16, 1965 is void for lack of consideration moving to the defendants.
POINT VI
ALLEGED AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 16, 1965 IS
VOID FOR UNFILLED CONDITION THAT ALL FIVE
DEFENDANTS SHOULD BECOME JOINT OBLIGORS.
Exhibit 3 of plaintiff's complaint shows on its face that
the alleged agreement of November 16, 1965 was to be a
joint obligation of the five defendant directors named as
Third parties therein, had it been supported by consideration and had the condition that all five sign thereon been
fulfilled. The agreement while naming the five defendants as Third parties does not state that the alleged agreement of indemnification is to be joint and several. On the
obligation on the earlier $50,000.00 note the directors
pledged to each other their obligation of contribution. By
having all five defendants sign, a right of contribution
would then exist provided the agreement were otherwise
legal.
The affidavits of both parties are unequivocal in swearing that it was a condition that all five defendants sign
the alleged November 16th agreement. The insistence of
that mutual intent is found in J. R. Berry's affidavit as
follows:
6. That following the meeting of November 11, 1965
and prior to the conveyance to the Homestead property to the corporation all of the parties concluded
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that their agreement should be reduced to a more
formal instrument ... that L. P. Slagle and Vivian
Schellar were not present at the meeting of Novem.
ber 17, 1965 but that the remaining third party defendants represented that they were in fact acting
for and on behalf of the two absent parties, ...
(R. 23).
The last clause is wholly immaterial in view of the
legal requirement, supra, that indemnitors must subscribe their agreement otherwise no liability can arise.
(Utah Code 1953, Sec. 25-5-4(2).
However, the first clause of the above quotation shows
Berry concurring with the Directors in their sworn statement that it was the mutual intent that all five directors
should sign before there could be any liability on the
directors, had the agreement been otherwise valid. (Directors' affidavit, R. 17). The condition was never fulfilled. Vivian Schellar and L. P. Slagle never signed the
agreement and continued to refuse to sign it (R. 17).
POINT VII

J. R. BERRY DOES NOT PLEAD AND DOES NOT
HAVE ANY SECURITY INTEREST.
As stated in the foregoing statement of facts, J. R.
Berry never made any claim of a security interest until
the filing of his affidavit about September 20, 1966. He
does not plead any claim of a security interest. The law
does not allow a wrongdoing agent any security interest.
especially when he surrenders possession of the property
on which is claimed a possessory lien. The law is stated
in Corpus Juris Secundum as follows:
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3 C.J.S. 140. In the absence of full knowledge and
consent on the part of his principal, an agent may not
acquire any right or title in the subject matter of
the agency by the use of his position.
An agent found guilty of breach of duty in this respect will be regarded as holding his newly acquired
interests as trustee for his principal 39 since all
rights, title or interests inure to the benefit of the
principal and the agent may be compelled to transfer
them to the latter 40 and to account for all profits
and benefits gained thereby.
While an agent is ordinarily "entitled to reimbursement for as much of the purchase money as represented by his own funds" ...
. . . An agent cannot recover from his principal in
any transaction in which the agent's interest was
antagonistic to the principal, unless such interest
was fully and fairly disclosed to the principal and
the principal's consent secured.
3 C.J.S. Sec. 198. A failure of the agent to keep and
render proper accounts may deprive the agent of
his right of reimbursement for expenses, losses or
damages arising from his performance of his duties
under his agency.
3 C.J.S. Sec. 200. If an agent is performing his duties
as authorized then he gains "a specific lien upon the
principal's property in his possession for his expenses during the course of his agency with reference to that property."
3 C.J.S. Sec. 201. An agent's lien may be extinguished
or lost by yielding possession of the property and
upon waiver of his right it is permanently lost.
In this case J. R. Berry asked the corporation at the
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stockholders' meeting on February 20, 1965 simply to
agree to reimburse him for his costs of acquisition of the
Homestead for himself and wife and the corporation
agreed. He delivered possession to the corporation on ,
April 1, 1965 when the directors had signed to be liable
for $50,000 second payment on the Holimestead, and
claimed no lien at that time or in November 1965 and the
lien, if it ever existed was lost when the directors became
obligated relying on the fact that he had assigned the purchase contract to the corporation. 26a
POINT VIII
FACTS CREATE AN ESOPPEL AGAINST J. R
BERRY.
The undisputed facts are that on February 20, 1965
Berry represented to the stockholders that he was assign·
ing his purchase contract of the Homestead to the cor·
poration (R. 32) and that he caused to be published in
the company Prospectus that such had been done.
The undisputed facts are that purchasing stockholders,
persons purchasing condominium contracts and particularly the five defendant directors relied and acted on
the representations that the Homestead purchase contract had been so assigned to the corporation. That at the
time defendants signed the $50,000.00 note as co-makers
to make the April 1, 1965 down payment by the corpor·
ation they fully relied upon the representation in the
Prospectus (R. 19) and representation repeatedly being
made by Mr. Berry and the salesmen whom he supervised
to persons purchasing stock (R. 54, 59, and 60) and to
persons purchasing condominiums (R. 41, 54, 57, 58, 62
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and 63) that the Homestead purchase contract had been
assigned to the corporation and that the corporation fully
owned its own unencumbered equity in the Homestead.
These facts created an equitable estoppel against J. R.
Berry to later claim that the directors must pay his debts
and liabilities incurred over a three-year period in order
to have him assign his dry trust rights and interests in
the Homestead property to the corporation.

CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully submit that the above facts
and the applicable law indicate that the summary judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. Ladru Jensen
1536 Harvard A venue
Salt Lake City, Utah and

Ronald C. Barker
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Third-Party
Defendants.

